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Forthcoming in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
 
Abstract: Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations (and trepidations) 
about the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have 
been sky high. These expectations have gone largely unfulfilled. But though the dream (or 
nightmare) of being able to control our biology is still far off, gene editing research has made 
enormous strides toward potential clinical use. This paper argues that when it comes to 
determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical context—germline 
intervention in reproductive medicine—issues about enhancement and eugenics are, for the 
foreseeable future, a red herring. Current translational goals for gene editing research involve a 
different kind of editing than would be required to achieve manipulation of complex traits such 
as intelligence, and there are more pressing (and unresolved) questions that need attention if 
clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility.  
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Discussion of the ethics of gene editing is haunted by the specter of biomedical enhancement. In 
one of the earliest papers on the subject, Leon Kass wrote that, regardless of clinical potential, 
gene editing raised profound ethical conundrums as “Genetic engineering...will be able to create 
new capacities, and hence establish new norms of health and fitness.”1 A huge literature has 
developed on the use of gene editing for purposes of biomedical enhancement, with passionate 
defenses of its potential and equally passionate criticisms of its potential harms.2 Even as 
research has progressed in different directions, much, if not most, work on gene editing in 
philosophical bioethics continues to focus on enhancement, including a number of articles in a 
recent special issue of this journal devoted to the topic.3 In a another recent paper on the topic, 
the authors affirmed that “Of greatest concern is editing of genes to confer advantageous traits 
not related to avoiding disease or preserving health.”4 Most statements on the use of gene editing 
in human beings so far from professional organizations, ethics boards, and advisory panels—
including the recent exhaustive report by the United States National Academies of Science, 
Engineering, and Medicine—have called for drawing the line at “therapeutic” uses and 
forbidding “enhancement” with gene editing, thus reaffirming the centrality of the distinction.5  
 The importance of enhancement for the ethics of gene editing is especially relevant for 
neuroethics. Though much of the discussion in neuroethics about enhancement is about methods 
such as pharmacological intervention,6 the potential for genetic enhancement of cognitive 
abilities is considered to pose a significant ethical issue for gene editing.7 The potential for 
enhancing cognitive abilities thus raises a particularly high bar for any clinical applications of 
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gene editing that could affect, directly or inadvertently, neural development. There is possibly no 
place where the difference between therapeutic and enhancing uses of gene editing is more 
ethically important than where editing could affect neural development and psychological traits. 
 Since the advent of recombinant DNA technology, expectations (and trepidations) about 
the potential for altering genes and controlling our biology at the fundamental level have been 
sky high. These expectations, however, have gone largely unfulfilled. The ability to eliminate all 
inherited diseases, choose traits, and make ourselves stronger, faster, and smarter does not appear 
to be in our foreseeable future. But though the dream (or nightmare) of being able to control our 
biology is still a ways off, gene editing research has made enormous strides toward potential 
clinical uses in reproductive medicine. My aim in this paper is to argue that debates about 
enhancement are of limited value in dealing with questions about foreseeable clinical uses of 
germline gene editing. This is for two reasons. First, the use of gene editing for biomedical 
enhancement in any sort of interesting way is not just technically far off, it involves a different 
kind of use of gene editing than is currently being pursued in research. Any use of gene editing to 
enhance our physical or psychological characteristics would likely involve affecting the 
developmental pathways for these traits in completely different ways than researchers are 
currently exploring. Second, and more importantly, there are significant questions about future 
clinical use even for very clearly therapeutic uses of germline gene editing. I will focus on one in 
depth: determining rationale for germline gene editing in cases where there are competing 
therapeutic options.  
 None of this is to say that enhancement will never be possible, nor is it to say that it is 
something we should not discuss. Rather, the conclusion to draw from this argument is that, 
when it comes to determining permissible uses of gene editing in one important medical 
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context—germline intervention in reproductive medicine—issues about enhancement and 
eugenics are, for the foreseeable future, likely a red herring. Current research is taking us in a 
different direction, and discussions about the ethics of enhancement are of limited use in the 
place we appear to be headed. Arguing about enhancement is of little relevance to the issues we 
are likely to encounter there, and there are more pressing (and unresolved) questions that need 
attention if the clinical use of gene editing in reproductive medicine ever becomes a possibility.  
 In sections 2 and 3, I will argue for these two reasons to move beyond worries about 
enhancement in the ethics of gene editing. In section 4, I will consider two alternatives to sorting 
uses of gene editing into “therapies” and “enhancements” for settling permissibility of, and 
guidelines for, future clinical use, before a brief conclusion in section 5.  
   
2. On the Site of Gene Editing 
The possibility of using gene editing on human beings to control our biology at the fundamental 
level has been a topic of intense discussion since the introduction of recombinant DNA 
techniques. Most of this discussion has been speculative, in the sense that it was based on 
speculation about what shape the application of gene editing technology to human beings would 
take. Over the past few years, this situation has changed. Several gene therapies8 for the 
treatment of diseases such as acute lymphoblastic leukemia and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma have 
been introduced into clinical use in the United States,9 and there have been significant 
developments in research on germline gene editing (GGE).10 The debate about use of GGE in 
humans is no longer speculative; we can, now, begin to get a sense of what a clinical application 
of GGE in humans could look like.  
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  One thing that is clear about the shape of GGE research is that it is different from the sort 
of editing that is likely to be needed in order to achieve the kinds of biomedical enhancement 
bioethicists fret about. Consider one of the most high profile research results to date,11 in which a 
team at Oregon Health and Science University (OHSU) used the CRISPR gene editing system to 
target and cleave a mutated MYBPC3 gene in human embryos.12 The particular mutation they 
were after is the cause of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a disease that causes weakness 
(myopathy) in cardiac muscle. It is a monogenic, autosomal dominant disorder, meaning a child 
has to inherit only one mutated allele of the gene in order to develop the disease; individuals who 
are heterozygous for the mutated allele will still have the disease.13 The team at OHSU used the 
CRISPR gene editing system to target the mutated MYBPC3 gene by introducing the system into 
an oocyte simultaneously with fertilization by sperm via intracytoplasmic sperm injection 
(ICSI).14 Through homology directed repair, the fertilized zygotes then replaced the cleaved gene 
with a healthy version of MYBPC3, thus resulting in zygotes that were homozygous for two 
healthy “wild type” MYBPC3 genes.15  
 The experiment was a huge step forward. The first attempt to use CRISPR on human 
embryos in 2015 resulted in a large rate of off-target effects and mosaicism in the edited 
embryos.16 By contrast, the recent experiment by the OHSU team showed dramatic reduction in 
off-target effects, and a larger batch of zygotes that showed no detectible abnormalities. This is a 
dramatic step toward potential clinical use of GGE, and in a very short period of time. However, 
the team at OHSU used CRISPR to target only a single small mutation in one gene—in this case, 
a four base pair deletion in MYBPC3.17 The team was able to remove the mutation and induce the 
embryos to repair the deletion so the stretch of DNA on one chromosome matched the stretch on 
the other. Interestingly and very importantly, the team was unsuccessful in getting induced 
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pluripotent stem cells (IPSCs) to take up synthetic DNA in place of the cleaved mutation; the 
rates of successful editing were extraordinarily low.18 Only when CRISPR was introduced 
simultaneously with fertilization via ICSI were the embryos able to repair themselves. So, this 
important experimental advance in human gene editing involved the use of CRISPR to target and 
cleave a four base pair deletion in one copy of one gene, and induce embryos to repair 
themselves so that the copy of the gene on one chromosome matched the “wild type” present in 
the population at large, and on the embryo’s other chromosome. To give a sense of the difference 
in magnitude in genetic causes of disease: there may be as many as forty one loci involved in risk 
for Parkinson’s Disease, and the causal pathways from these genes to development of the disease 
are largely unknown.19 Nevertheless, this is a very impressive result; by using CRISPR to repair 
a small defect in these embryos, the team showed that gene editing can be used to cure, and 
potentially remove from a family lineage forever, a fatal genetic mutation.20  
 It is, however, different in kind from the use of CRISPR or any other gene editing 
technique to “enhance” compex traits like intelligence. The issue is not that current gene editing 
tools aren’t sophisticated or powerful enough; the issue is that applications currently being 
pursued are very different from anything like enhancement. Complex traits like intelligence 
(assuming, for the sake of argument, they have a very strong genetic basis in the first place) are 
almost certainly the result of large numbers of genes working in concert over the course of 
development, potentially deep into an individual’s life. Research in genetics and developmental 
biology raises a number of problems with the very idea that complex traits can be affected by 
edits to single, or even small packages, of genes.21 There does not appear to be any, or at least 
many, ‘magic switch’ genes that are involved in the development of traits such as language use 
or other important cognitive skills.22 These traits are the result of large numbers of genes, and so 
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any editing will have to involve making multiple changes. Current research into GGE in humans, 
on the other hand, involves targeting single genes that are heavily causally implicated in the 
etiology of a set of genetic diseases (monogenic, autosomal, inherited genetic disorders). 
Applications of GGE currently being explored simply do not involve the kind of editing that 
would be required for affecting complex physiological and psychological traits.  
 Second, complex traits are not just the result of large numbers of genes, but rather of 
patterns of expression over the course of development. Depending on the trait, expression is 
affected not only by conditions in utero, but exogenous factors of a dizzying variety. All of the 
interesting human traits that bioethicists fret about “enhancing” are the result of complex 
developmental and molecular pathways involving multiple genes, precisely orchestrated patterns 
of expression, and multiple epigenetic mechanisms. For this reason, many philosophers of 
biology argue that it is better to think of the relevant causal units here as “developmental 
pathways”—packages of genes, epigenetic mechanisms, and patterns of expression, that are 
canalized to varying degrees.23 Gene editing techniques like CRISPR can be used to affect gene 
expression in simpler model organisms;24 in humans, such moves have not even been tried, and 
given restrictions on embryo and stem cell research, may not be tried any time in the foreseeable 
future (or ever).  
 I do not mean to suggest here anything about, to use the old-fashioned terms, the relative 
value of ‘nature’ versus ‘nurture’; nor do I mean to make claims about the scientific or technical 
possibilities of enhancement. GGE research (along with research on early human development, 
generally) will surely yield better understanding of the pathways from genes to traits, as 
manipulating genes to see how this changes the developmental pathways for different pathogenic 
traits is an excellent way to learn more about genetic causation.25 This is something that gene 
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editing in model organisms has shown in developmental biology research.26 It is very possible 
that one day scientists can build on all this research to see how developmental pathways for 
complex traits can be manipulated in vivo, and biomedical enhancement may become a technical 
possibility. We cannot wish away the general hard questions about enhancement and eugenics, 
and I do not mean to argue that they should be ignored.  
 What I do mean to argue here is that the two differences discussed above show that the 
current state of reseach on GGE involves a difference in kind, not just in degree of technical 
sophistication, from the use of GGE for biomedical enhancement. Use of GGE in enhancement 
involves targeting multiple genes, and influencing expression over the course of development, 
and potentially even deep into an individual’s life span. By contrast, current research on GGE is 
focused on techniques for making edits to pathogenic mutations in single genes that are heavily 
causally implicated in development of specific diseases. The experiment discussed in this section 
involves investigating whether CRISPR—a highly useful research tool in the life sciences—can 
be adapted for clinical uses in human beings. It is wrong to assume that translation of the 
technique for one kind of clinical application is either the same as, or at least strongly connected 
to, other (currently speculative) potential uses.27 Use of gene editing for biomedical enhancement 
will involve making multiple edits, using the technology to influence gene expression, and will 
in many cases have to involve swapping of pieces of DNA with synthetic DNA (something that, 
as the OHSU experiment showed, is still not technically feasible in human embryos). This is a 
different application of gene editing technology altogether from repair of pathogenic mutations. 
 Another way to think of this is in terms of implementation. In a commentary on an article 
about moral enhancement in a special issue of this journal on gene editing, Nicholas Agar noted 
that there are two levels of questions about enhancement. One is about whether it should be done 
 9 
at all: whether biomedical enhancement is ever permissible, and if so what uses of it would be 
justifiable. A second level concerns what he calls “implementation problems,” which includes 
questions about what technologies should be used to achieve enhancement goals, how they 
should be distributed, and whether they are likely to have the intended effects (and not, for 
instance, a slew of unintended consequences).28 Suppose we did consider biomedical 
enhancement permissible, and considered GGE a feasible and morally permissible way to 
achieve this. If so, the kind of editing that is the focus of current research would fail as a means 
of implementing our enhancement goals. We likely could not effect changes to traits such as 
intelligence by making small edits to single genes. This is a different kind of editing than what is 
necessary to implement the sorts of biomedical enhancement bioethicists typically discuss. 
 There is an important caveat to all of this. Though it may not be possible to affect 
complex cognitive traits, it may be possible to create propensities for developing enhanced 
versions of more fine-grained traits through small edits. A good example of this is the previously 
mentioned (see note 11) controversial use of CRISPR to edit the CCR5 gene in two twin girls 
carried out in 2018 by He Jiankui. CCR5 is believed to be involved in memory; lab mice with the 
CCR5 deletion He induced in the twin girls perform better in experiments to test memory than 
other mice, and CCR5 is implicated in quicker recovery from stroke in humans.29 There is no 
conclusive evidence, but there is enough to suggest—emphasis on suggest—that editing of this 
one gene could impact neural development and memory. 
 Cases such as this show that successful regulation of the kinds of clinical applications 
being pursued require drawing very fine grained lines of permissibility. We need to consider not 
just specific clinical applications and their goals, but also specific targets. This may look like an 
impossible task, but it is not, and in fact, as I will argue in section 4, is much more conceptually 
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tractable than trying to sort applications into “therapies” and “enhancements” and drawing a bold 
line between these two categories. This sort of case also illustrates the unique neuroethics issues 
raised by GGE, as it shows the extra stakes involved with any editing that could effect neural 
development. Quite apart from whether editing CCR5 can boost memory, there is enough 
evidence to suggest that it could have some effect on neural development. Targeting the gene for 
one particular purpose—in this case, inducing immunity to HIV infection—could have a 
significant set of unintended effects on the girls’ cognitive traits and psychological makeup.30 
There are then an important set of questions in neuroethics about what sorts of impacts on neural 
development and cognitive traits would be permissible, what sorts would raise the risks of GGE 
beyond acceptable levels, and what these impacts would mean for the resulting persons, that 
have significant bearing on the ethics of GGE.  
 Cases like the CCR5 editing case look like they pose a significant problem for the line of 
argument pursued above. The CCR5 editing case seems to show that any kind of GGE, even its 
use to correct pathogenic mutations in single genes, inevitably opens the door to more 
controversial uses of gene editing, and shows why germline intervention of any kind crosses an 
ethical red line—an ethical and psychological barrier that, once crossed, introduces new 
possibilities and changes the probabilities of all sorts of uses of gene editing in the future.31 
 This is an old argument, and has been deployed in different forms against different 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) and research using embryos and embryonic stem 
cells.32 The argument depends on a significant hidden premise: that we could not draw more fine-
grained lines between different germline interventions, permitting some but not others. This 
premise in turn depends on a suspect conceptual move: lumping all germline interventions 
together into a single category, regardless of their respective technical details and clinical goals. 
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The discussion in this section shows why this is mistaken. We were easily able to make a 
threefold distinction between edits to single genes to correct a pathogenic mutation, edits to 
single genes to induce a propensity for a better-than-baseline cognitive trait, and edits to multiple 
genes to impact complex traits. There is no reason why regulation of GGE could not permit the 
first but forbid the second and third (in section 4, I will propose exactly this).  
 Another response is that we cannot take our cues about what ethical issues are important 
from the current state of a technology; given how rapidly research on gene editing is progressing, 
this above picture of the current state of the art could well be outdated in the future. (Depending 
on when you are reading this article, maybe it already is!) This is partly true; just because some 
forseeable use of a technology is not proximate in time does not mean it is not important, or is 
not important enough to subject to ethical scrutiny. However, though ethical issues about 
technological changes that are nearer to us in time may not have more importance than those that 
are farther off, they may have more urgency. In considering the ethics of a new technology, 
priority may need to be assigned to uses of technology that are closer in time than those that are 
farther off, even if the farther off uses are equally or more significant. Consider: the development 
of a fully intelligent artificial agent may be a far more significant advance in AI technology than 
better facial recognition technology or more efficient autonomous driving programs, but the 
urgency of ethical issues about the latter (use of facial recognition technology by governments in 
law enforcement, for instance, or wholesale shifts in transportation to autonomous vehicles) may 





3. Beyond ‘Therapy’ and ‘Enhancement’ 
Even though the kind of editing discussed above would likely fail as a path toward biomedical 
enhancement (with the caveat of cases such as “dual use” editing of genes like CCR5), there are 
still very serious ethical issues about how it could, or should, be used. A legacy of the intense 
focus on enhancement in the ethics of gene editing is that the line between therapeutic and 
enhancing uses of gene editing is treated as very relevant. The difference between a therapeutic 
application and one that aims at enhancement is supposed to be a very consequential one.33 There 
are, however, serious ethical issues with even very clearly therapeutic uses of GGE, and 
classifying applications of GGE as therapeutic and delineating them from enhancements does 
little to alleviate them.  
 There is a huge literature on the therapy/enhancement distinction in medicine. The 
problems with drawing the distinction clearly are well known, and the ground is well trodden.34 I 
am not going to rehearse the main arguments or the well-known difficulties with the distinction 
here. For purposes of the following argument, we can assume that these problems have all been 
solved. Even if we had a clear therapy/enhancement distinction, this would do little to shed light 
on some very difficult problems regarding therapeutic uses of GGE. Consider the following 
situation. Suppose we are at the point where we can use GGE to, as in the OHSU team’s 
experiment, correct small pathogenic mutations. A treatment for, say, beta thalassemia is 
developed that involves making precise corrections at the point of fertliziation of an oocyte via 
ICSI.35 But, at the same time, a gene therapy for beta thalassemia has also been developed, a 
medical goal which is actively being pursued today.36 Let us also suppose the treatment is 
effective and safe early in life, so that the individuals involved can, with either treatment, live the 
bulk of their lives (ceteris paribus) free from beta thalassemia. For individuals who carry the 
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gene, with a family history of beta thalassemia, there are thus two different treatment options 
(assume, for the sake of argument, we have ruled out the relatively “low tech” options of 
adoption and use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis). One is to bring a pregnancy to term, see 
if the child has the condition or is free of disease, and if the child has beta thalassemia, to treat it 
through gene therapy. Another is GGE—to make edits to the gene at the point of conception, and 
use only those zygotes free of the mutation to create a pregnancy, thus ensuring the child is free 
of disease.  
 There are two questions here. One is a clinical question: how do we determine which is 
the better therapeutic option?37 This is not an ethical question in and of itself, but it does involve 
at least some weighing of harms and benefits. The second though is an ethical question: if both 
of these treatments are available, does this affect the permissibility of using GGE? Given the 
higher general risks (at least early in its potential clinical use) of GGE as opposed to somatic 
gene editing, and given background concerns about opening the door to other, less clearly 
therapeutic uses of gene editing, we may think that absent any compelling reason to prefer it to 
alternative therapies, editing at the germline should not be permissible. 
 In this hypothetical case there is, however, one significant clinical benefit that germline 
gene editing has over gene therapy: fixing the mutated HBB gene that causes beta thalassemia 
could potentially wipe it out of the subject’s family lineage, as editing at the germline means the 
fixed gene will be present in all the individual’s cells, including gametes, and so will be heritable. 
A gene therapy used in infancy will only treat the disease in this particular individual. The 
heritability of changes to the genome of an individual at the germline is the source of a great deal 
of ethical consternation.38 But paradoxically the heritability of changes at the germline is also a 
significant clinical benefit over other treatments for the same disease. It not only removes the 
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disease from the next generation, but decreases risks to future generations through future 
reproductive choices, and removes a significant dark cloud hanging over the reproductive 
choices for successive generations—or in other words, the children and grandchildren of those 
opting for GGE never have to go through the same difficult and expensive decisionmaking 
process.39  
 As Soren Holm points out, in his contribution to a special issue of this journal on gene 
editing, the use of GGE to affect the creation and constitution of future persons raises a number 
of questions.40 First, risks to the child from the gene therapy are, to a large degree at least, known 
and quantifiable. Risks to the child (and future generations), in this hypothetical example of the 
first use of GGE, will not be. Second, some of these risks are caused by the very thing that makes 
GGE a potential benefit over gene therapy—the heritability of the change to the child’s genome. 
The risks of making heritable changes have to be weighed against the potential benefits of 
making nonheritable changes through a gene therapy. And third, opting for gene therapy 
involves imposing risk on an existing person, whereas GGE will involve risks for a potential 
person.41 The already existing child has a baseline set of risks and expectations resulting from 
their disease, against which we can weigh the harms and benefits of gene therapy. The potential 
child has no such baseline—they will be born with whatever risks are induced through the gene 
editing process built into their physical makeup. It is not clear what the relevant comparison class 
is for settling risks versus benefits for the potential, edited child. The natural comparison class 
would seem to be those born with beta thalassemia who have to undergo gene therapy.  
 But a case could be made here that the right class is the population at large. Any child at 
all will be born with such built in risks. Do risks introduced via the editing process depart 
significantly from those for a representative child (with a family history, say, of heart disease, or 
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parents who smoke, and/or a myriad of other risk factors)? If the answer is no (emphasis on if), 
then GGE seems to offer a much better option over gene therapy: the risk to the potential child is 
much higher with the latter than the former. This is, paradoxically, the case even if the risks of 
GGE are higher than those from the gene therapy. The latter set of risks involve the imposition 
of harms on a child, whereas the former do not—the child is simply born with a biological 
property (being an edited subject) that introduces a set of risks that are not significantly different 
than the biological properties that introduce risks to any of us (having a family history of 
diabetes, or alcoholism, and so on). Or to put it differently, even if GGE is riskier than gene 
therapy in this case, bringing an edited subject into the world involves no more harm to them 
than bringing a child into the world at all, whereas bringing a child into the world with beta 
thalassemia and then putting them through a process of gene therapy involves two factors 
(having beta thalassemia, going through gene therapy) that involve significant departures from 
the average level of risk. If this line of argument goes through, then, as Holm notes, “...almost no 
uses of genetic modification in reproduction can be deemed as unsafe.”42 The relevant 
comparison class here, then, matters a great deal.  
 These are tricky ethical calculations. But crucially—they have little to nothing to do with 
enhancement. The use of GGE in this hypothetical scenario is an unquestionably therapeutic use, 
and any ethical considerations about the distinction between therapeutic and enhancing uses of 
GGE is of little relevance for this clinical application. The complications in this case stem from 
the particulars of GGE (that it involves making heritable changes to embryos that could become 
future people). These are questions, then, specifically about clinical uses of GGE, that require us 
to move beyond worries about ‘therapy’ versus ‘enhancement.’ These are also questions that 
weigh heavily on current ethical issues about GGE research. If it is true that, in our future 
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scenario, the existence of the gene therapy cancels out any justification for GGE, then we may 
think that it is better to invest resources into research for gene therapies for these diseases instead 
of the (ethically more controversial) option of editing at the germline.43  
  
4. Ethics for GGE Where the Action Is 
Instead of sorting different uses of GGE into broad categories like ‘therapies’ and 
‘enhancements,’ and treating any use of GGE as crossing an ethical red line that automatically 
introduces the possibility of the latter, it is better to focus attention where the action is: the 
specific techniques and targets themselves.44 The experiment described above in section 2 
involved correcting a genetic abnormality that causes disease. The editing in this case resulted in 
an embryo that had two healthy alleles of a common gene. It involved, in other words, restoring 
the mutated allele to a healthy “wild type” version present in the human population. This is 
different from inducing a change in what would be an otherwise healthy embryo (which is what 
He Jiankui did, in the case discussed in section 2), or in introducing a gene via transfer of 
synthetic DNA that an embryo would not otherwise carry. Correcting a genetic abnormality is 
something that is perfectly permissible in adults (through somatic gene editing). The ethical 
issues that arise from it have to do with editing at the germline, not with the editing itself. This is 
not the case with inducing changes to otherwise healthy individuals or in introducing novel genes, 
which may well be impermissible no matter what.45  
 This looks very much like a good place to draw an initial line. There are still many 
significant philosophical questions here: What is the difference between an otherwise healthy 
embryo and one that has an ‘unhealthy’ abnormality? What would be the difference between 
correcting an abnormality that causes a disease, and one that creates a propensity for a chronic 
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disease? What is a ‘wild type’ gene, and how does it differ from a novel or synthetic gene? What 
is the difference between correcting a genetic abnormality and inducing a change? Nevertheless, 
these are at least somewhat tractable because of their specificity. We can consider what 
genotypes are pathogenic or which changes result in an abnormal genotype by comparison with 
the population as a whole, instead of debating about what counts as ‘normal’ and 
‘pathological.’46 
 Another possibility is to draw the line at edits to one gene. Editing single genes, as the 
initial research has shown, has many potential clinical uses. But there is only so much that you 
can do to affect phenotypes with edits to single genes. Drawing the line at single gene edits 
makes it virtually impossible to do many of the things with GGE that many bioethicists (and 
people, generally) find objectionable (again, with some caveats). It is also the case that single 
gene edits have a drastically lower threshold of risk than multiple gene edits. There are large, and 
still not completely defined, risks to editing single genes. But once you start editing multiple 
genes, you not only have to worry about adding risks from multiple different edits, you also have 
to worry about intragenic effects, and so the risk not only is additive, it is compounded. Given 
the current state of gene editing technology, it is hard to see multiple gene edits in human 
embryos being a safe and effective clinical possibility in the foreseeable future, so the de facto 
line of permissible use of gene editing will be drawn at single gene edits anyway. 
 Both of these are perfectly serviceable as conditions on permissibility for future clinical 
uses of GGE. Should GGE become a real possibility, guidelines for use will be necessary. These 
will be important for a number of reasons: they will make it clear to the public and to patients 
what the technology can be used for, they will set clear boundaries to hold providers accountable 
and determine what is and is not an abuse or an ‘off label’ use, and they will help to mitigate 
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risks from more adventurous uses of gene editing until the technology has become more familiar, 
and a large body of data on its overall safety and efficacy in reproductive medicine is available. 
But they are, also, a significant improvement over simply lumping all germline interventions into 
a single category. There are real differences between different uses of GGE. Some of these uses 
will appropriately trigger worries about enhancement. Others do not, and breaking out these uses 
into different categories allows for a greatly improved understanding of the ethical terrain and 
better regulation and governance overall.  
  
5. Conclusion  
I have argued in this paper that debates about biomedical enhancement are of limited value when 
it comes to some potential clinical uses of GGE in the foreseeable future. This is because current 
research is of a different kind than research into uses of GGE for biomedical enhancement, and 
because there are significant ethical questions for even clearly therapeutic uses of GGE. I have 
also made some proposals for intial lines of permissibility for these foreseeable clinical uses. 
Regardless of worries about enhancement, the safest bet is that, for better or for worse, research 
on GGE in humans will continue, and the world will get closer and closer to the point where its 
potential clinical use is a real possibility. Bioethicists should not give up on broader questions 
about whether GGE is permissible, or even desirable, and certainly should not stop caring about 
biomedical enhancement or the distinction between therapy and enhancement in medicine. But 
there is also great need for work on other issues. As I have pointed out at several places in this 
paper, there is a particularly relevant role for neuroethics in this discussion, as many important 
issues in the ethics of gene editing intersect with issues in neuroethics about altering cognitive 
traits through medical interventions.  
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 A perhaps rosier look at it is this: many technologies were let loose on the world without 
sufficient scrutiny, and without reflection on what the right way to use them would be. Right 
now there is a great opportunity for all those who study medicine to avoid this situation for what 
could be one of the most significant medical innovations in human history. We should continue 
to talk about biomedical enhanmcement, and what it means for our notions of dignity, autonomy, 
and human nature. But, given the possibility that we may end up in a situation in which gene 
editing is done regardless, we also need to talk about how, in such a world, it could be done right.  
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